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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Utah Court of Appeals created a new rule permitting an 
award of alimony based upon a hypothetical standard of living not 
enjoyed during the marriage. This court should review and reverse 
2 
that decision, effecting compliance with Utah law governing 
alimony. 
OFFICIM RPPQZT OF Tffl? UTAH COURT OF A?FmX>$ 
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was issued 
on February 28, 1991. It has been published in the Utah Advanced 
Reporter where it is cited as Howel 1 v. Howel 1. 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 
18 (Utah App. 1991). For the convenience of the court, a copy of 
each is attached hereto as Appendices "A" and "B". 
Wm$DlQTI01t 
A. The Utah Court of Appeals decision was published February 
28, 1991. 
B. No order respecting rehearing or extension of time to 
petition for certiorari has been made and as none has been 
requested. 
C. This petition for the writ of certiorari is submitted 28 
days after the issuance of the opinion by the Utah Court of Appeals 
which, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, is within the thirty (30) days after entry of 
the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
D. This court has jurisdiction to review the decision in this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-
2-2(5) of the Utah Code (1990). 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
When a Decree of Divorce is 
rendered, the court may include in 
it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, and parties. 
Utah Code §30-3-5(1) (1990) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action. The parties were married on October 
14, 1956. The husband began working as a pilot for Western 
Airlines shortly after the parties were married. When the parties 
separated and the husband filed for divorce, in November of 1986, 
his income had been between $5,500.00 and $5,600. 00 per month for 
the five (5) previous years. The defendant had little work 
experience during the marriage of the parties and raised five (5) 
children. Four of them were emancipated by the time of trial. 
After the divorce action was filed, Western Airlines was acquired 
by Delta Airlines and husband' s income rose substantially so that 
by the time of trial, it was approximately $10,000.00 per month. 
(Slip op. at 1-2, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18-19). 
The trial court determined that the standard of living of the 
parties during the course of their marriage should be set by 
examining the five (5) years prior to the divorce, during which 
time the plaintiff earned $5,500.00 to $5,600.00 per month. (Slip 
op. at 1-2, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18-19). 
Two members of the panel in the Utah Court of Appeals held 
that the trial court abused its discretion in pinpointing the 
parties' standard of living at the time of separation. Although 
the court professed to apply the standards for alimony awards set 
by this court, that is, by examining the financial condition and 
needs of the recipient spouse; the recipient' s ability to produce 
income; the ability of the payor spouse to provide income, Davis v. 
Davis. 749 P. 2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988); and, the standard of living 
4 
prior to the divorce, Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P. 2d 1076 (Utah 
1988); the court of appeals did not do so. The decision of the 
court of appeals, in effect, requires the trial court to project a 
standard of living which never existed during the marriage; that 
is, what the husband could now afford. (Slip op. at 3-7, 155 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 19-21. ) 
This change in Utah law was identified by the dissenting 
judge, Judge Bench, who correctly pointed out the error of the 
other two judges when he observed: 
Defendant seeks to benefit from plaint!ff s 
raise by mistakenly, and unnecessarily, 
claiming that the raise entitled her to 
alimony based upon a hypothetical standard of 
living to be calculated from plaintiff s new 
annual salary of $120,000, an income to which 
she has never grown accustomed. In other 
words, defendant claims that her relevant 
standard of living is the unknown standard of 
living that she might have enjoyed were the 
parties not terminating their marriage. (Slip 
op. at 10, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22). 
ARGUMENT 
As Judge Bench correctly pointed out in his dissent, the 
majority opinion creates a new standard for an award of alimony in 
Utah, contrary to that articulated in English v. English. 565 P. 2d 
409 (Utah 1977), and restated in Davis. where this court 
articulated the basic rule that governs an award of alimony in 
Utah; that is, that the trial court must consider the financial 
condition and needs of the recipient spouse, the recipient7 s 
ability to produce income, the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support, at a level enjoyed during the marriage and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge. (565 P. 2d at 411. ) 
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This court somewhat modified that standard in Gardner v. Gardner. 
748 P. 2d 1076 (Utah 1988), when it declared that an alimony award 
should, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living and maintain them as close as possible to that 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 
In the instant case, two members of the panel of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, when faced with the circumstance of a husband 
whose income doubled during the pendency of the divorce, rejected 
those alimony determination guidelines and have, without authority, 
articulated a new rule. This is contrary to the decision of the 
court of appeals itself in ffrf/jfanfrauah v> ffxidepbaucrh. 786 P. 2d 241 
(Utah App. 1990), where the court declared that the standard of 
living during the marriage is the basis for reexamination of an 
alimony award. 
In this case, the trial judge set alimony at roughly one-third 
(1/3) of the amount received by the parties during their marriage. l 
The majority of the panel of the court of appeals did not accept 
that ruling and has ordered, as the dissenting judge discerned, the 
trial judge to award alimony for a standard of living that never 
existed. That is an award based on income of $10,000.00 a month 
rather than $5, 500. 00 a month. By so ruling, the two judges of the 
panel seek to rewrite the law of alimony in Utah in a fashion that 
is contrary to the guidelines articulated by this court. This 
The trial court awarded $1,800.00 of husband9 s earnings as alimony. 
This would rationalize to a division of the income of the parties as 
follows: 1/3 to taxes, 1/2 the balance to the husband, 1/2 the 
balance to the wife, which directly follows the Gardner mandate. 
6 
action renders the decision in conflict with prior Utah decisions 
and substantially departs from the law governing the establishment 
of alimony, which requires this court in the exercise of proper 
judicial supervision, to review that decision. 
This court should grant a writ of certiorari and after 
appropriate examination, vacate the decision of the majority of the 
panel of the Utah Court of Appeals, and remand the case for 
decision in light of the governing authorities as cited and 
articulated by Judge Bench in his dissent. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of 9^2^ ^ A / 
1991. 
AVID S. DOLOWITZ 7 
Attorney for Petitioner ^ 
APPENDIX 
A. Howell v. Howell, No. 890596-CA (Utah App. Feb. 28, 
1991). 
B. Howell v. Howell. 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. 1991). 
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Howell (No. D87-4343). 
D. Decree of Divorce, Howell (No. D87-4343). 
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February 28, 1991. OPINION (For Publication). 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and 
the Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is 
now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the 
district court herein be, and the same is, affirmed in 
part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings 
in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion filed 
herein. 
Opinion of the Court by PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge; 
REGNAL W. GARFF, Judge, concurs. RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge, 
concurrs in part and dissents in part, by separate opinion. 
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Douglas, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant, Barbara Joyce Howell, appeals from a divorce 
decree's award of alimony and division of equity in a 
California home. We affirm the property division but reverse 
and remand as to alimony. 
FACTS 
Defendant and plaintiff, Walter James Howell, were married 
on October 14, 1956. Plaintiff began working as a pilot for 
Western Airlines shortly after the parties married. He 
continued to be employed as a pilot with Western, later taken 
over by Delta Airlines, throughout the parties' marriage. The 
parties had five children, four of whom were emancipated at the 
time of trial. The parties had marital difficulties on and off 
for a number of years and separated in November 1986. At that 
time, plaintiffs gross income was between $5500 and $5600 per 
month, and had been at that level for the prior five years. 
Western Airlines experienced financial problems prior to the 
takeover by Delta Airlines. As a result of negotiations 
between Western and its pilots, plaintiff received virtually no 
pay raises between 1981 and 1986, despite increases in the cost 
of living. Both parties testified that their family finances 
were strained during that time period. 
Plaintiff filed for divorce in November 1987. At the time 
of trial, December 1988, his gross monthly income had increased 
to $10,120. Plaintiff's financial declaration indicated 
monthly expenses of $7960, which included $2400 for alimony and 
child support, $372 for vacations, and $633 for attorney fees. 
During the parties' marriage, defendant was a homemaker 
and had worked only part time at unskilled labor jobs. At the 
time of trial defendant earned $649.80 per month, though that 
job was only temporary and terminated in December 1988. She 
testified at trial that she had monthly expenses totaling 
$5021.x 
The parties owned homes in Utah and California, as well as 
real property in Texas. Plaintiff testified that the Utah home 
had little, if any, equity, while the California home would 
yield substantial equity. Plaintiff wanted to sell all the 
properties and divide the net proceeds. Defendant testified 
she would prefer to live in the California home. 
After trial, the court entered findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce on May 12, 1989. 
In its findings, the court states its belief that "the income 
level of $5500 reflects the income level and living standards 
of the parties during the last five years of their lives 
together." The court found that defendant was capable of 
earning $625 per month, and that plaintiff had income of 
$10,000 per month. The findings further state that "[t]he 
court has determined in setting alimony that while $5,500.00 
per month represents the living standards of the parties in the 
last 5 years of the marriage, when the parties resided 
together, the ability of the plaintiff to pay alimony is based 
upon his present income of $10,000.00 per month." Defendant 
was awarded $1800 per month alimony and $1363 per month child 
support for the parties' then sixteen year-old child, based on 
the child support guidelines then in effect. The court ordered 
1. Defendant filed an earlier declaration of monthly expenses 
totaling $4464.62, but included no expenses for real property 
taxes or insurance, indicating that they were then unknown. 
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that all of the real property, including the California home, be 
sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties. 
On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the parties' standard of 
living, for purposes of determining alimony, should be based on 
that at the time of trial; (2) the alimony awarded is 
insufficient; and (3) the trial court should have taken into 
consideration the tax consequences of selling the California 
home. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining 
alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be 
upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 
1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Findings of fact in divorce appeals 
are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review such 
that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for 
correctness and given no special deference on appeal. Bountiful 
v. Rilev, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 793 
P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
ALIMONY 
Defendant claims that the alimony award would have been 
higher if the trial court had considered the parties' standard 
of living at the time of trial rather than when the parties 
separated, approximately two years earlier. Additionally, 
defendant claims alimony should have been higher because of the 
disparity in the parties' income, length of the marriage, and 
the parties* respective earning abilities and expenses. We 
consider first the applicable standard of living question. 
The value of marital property is determined as of the time 
of the divorce decree or trial. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 
1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980). See also Beraer v. Berqer, 713 P.2d 
695, 697 (Utah 1985). The reason for the rule is that "[b]y the 
very nature of a property division, the marital estate is 
evaluated according to what property exists at the time the 
marriage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 
328 (Utah 1980). Courts can, however, in the exercise of their 
equitable powers, use a different date, such as the date of 
separation, if one party has "acted obstructively, . . . " Peck 
v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
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No cases in Utah or elsewhere, that we or counsel have 
discovered, have specifically addressed the question of when a 
couple's "standard of living" should be determined for the 
purpose of calculating alimony, be it separation or trial or 
some other time. Most speak only of the standard of living 
during marriage. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 
(Utah 1983). "Standard of living" is defined as "a minimum of 
necessities, comforts, or luxuries that is essential to 
maintaining a person in customary or proper status or 
circumstances." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
2223 (1986). "An alimony award should, to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards 
. . . ." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 
1980) . 
In this case, the parties were separated for approximately 
one year before plaintiff filed for divorce. About one year 
later, trial was held. We note that a separation of two years 
before trial in a divorce action is certainly not unusual. 
During that two-year period, plaintiff's income doubled because 
of the successful takeover of Western Airlines by Delta 
Airlines. Plaintiff's ability to take advantage of that change 
was at least in part a result of having persevered during the 
lean times, as did his wife and children. The impact of the 
salary increase on the parties' standard of living, however, was 
certainly affected by the fact that it was used to maintain 
separate living arrangements. 
We believe it is consistent with the goal of equalizing the 
parties' post divorce status to look to the standard of living 
existing at or near the time of trial in determining alimony. 
This is consonant with the treatment of both marital property 
and child support and is better designed to equip both parties 
to go forward with their separate lives with relatively equal 
odds. It is further justified because any future changes in 
alimony are limited to instances where a material change of 
circumstances has occurred. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 
P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In so holding, we agree 
with the dissenting opinion that determining standard of living 
is a "fact-sensitive, subjective task." We disagree, however, 
that standard of living is determined by actual expenses alone. 
Those expenses may be necessarily lower than needed to maintain 
an appropriate standard of living for various reasons, 
including, possibly, lack of income. As Webster says, standard 
of living includes "customary or proper status" considering the 
parties' circumstances. Those circumstances should be evaluated 
at the time of trial and, contrary to the dissent, can properly 
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address what situation would have existed if the parties had not 
separated earlier. In this case, the post-separation 
substantial increase in plaintiff's income was akin to deferred 
income. In light of the facts of this case, we conclude that 
the trial court erred in looking at the pre-separation standard 
of living in setting alimony, but should have instead considered 
the standard of living "during the marriage" up to the time of 
trial. In so concluding we do not intend to establish a rigid 
rule which must be followed in all domestic cases, but 
acknowledge that trial courts have discretion to determine the 
standard of living which existed during the marriage after 
consideration of all relevant facts and equitable principles. 
In this case, it was inequitable and an abuse of discretion to 
pinpoint standard of living as of the time of the parties' 
separation. 
We now turn to defendant's argument that the court did not 
properly consider all relevant factors, resulting in an 
unjustifiably low alimony award. Trial courts must consider the 
following factors in setting alimony: (1) the financial 
condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the recipient's 
ability to produce income; and (3) the ability of the payor 
spouse to provide support. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 
(Utah 1988). Utah cases have stated that the purpose of alimony 
is to prevent the receiving spouse "from becoming a public 
charge" and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage, to the extent possible. Fletcher, 615 P.2d at 
1223. Therefore, trial courts should first, determine the 
financial needs and resources for both parties, by examining the 
three factors enumerated. Second, the court should set alimony 
as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the parties' 
standard of living during the marriage as closely as possible. 
It follows that if the payor spouse's resources are adequate, 
alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic needs, but 
should also consider the recipient spouse's "station in life." 
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978). In Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed an alimony award after a long-term marriage. The court 
found that the alimony award in that situation should, "to the 
extent possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." 1£. at 1081. 
See also Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah 1986); Olson 
v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985). 
The trial court must make findings on all material issues. 
Failure to do so constitutes reversible error, unless pertinent 
facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment." Andersen 
v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
890596-CA 5 
Utah's appellate courts have considered the appropriateness 
of alimony after a long term marriage, where the wife (usually) 
has worked primarily in the home, has limited job skills, and is 
in her late forties or fifties. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076; 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333. In Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985), the supreme court found alimony awarded inadequate 
to allow the wife a standard of living even approaching that 
experienced during the marriage, and described the marriage as 
follows: 
During most of the marriage, with the 
full consent and support of her husband, 
[the wife] devoted her time to raising 
their four children and donating her 
services to various social service 
organizations. . . . It is entirely 
unrealistic to assume that a woman in 
her mid-50's with no substantial work 
experience or training will be able to 
enter the job market and support herself 
in anything even resembling the style in 
which the couple had been living. 
Id. at 1075. 
In this case the court made findings as to both 
plaintiff's and defendant's gross incomes. It did not, 
however, make the required finding as to defendant's financial 
needs, although defendant testified to monthly expenses of 
approximately $5,000. Child support set pursuant to child 
support guidelines at $1363, plus alimony of $1800, plus 
defendant's potential salary as determined by the court of 
$645, yields total gross monthly income of $3808 for defendant 
and her son. Plaintiff, after deducting child support and 
alimony, has gross monthly income of $6837. When his child 
support obligation ceases, approximately fifteen months after 
the decree, he will have gross monthly income of $8200 in 
comparison to defendant's $2445. Defendant fits the profile 
described in Jones and other cases: she is approximately fifty 
years old, has minimal marketable job skills, and has spent 
most of the thirty plus years of the parties' marriage raising 
and caring for their five children and their home, presumably 
2. "If courts award child support in lieu of permanent 
alimony, they may fail to anticipate the financial impact on 
the remaining family as each child reaches age 18 and his or 
her award terminates." March 1990 Utah Task Force on Gender 
and Justice Report to the Utah Judicial Council 38. 
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with the concurrence of plaintiff. Her likelihood of achieving 
significant salary levels in the future is slim. The alimony 
set by the court does not come close to equalizing the parties' 
standard of living as of the time of the divorce, but allows 
plaintiff a two to four times advantage.3 We, therefore, hold 
that the alimony amount set by the court was clearly 
erroneous. 
We reverse and remand to the trial court on the issue of 
alimony, for findings as to defendant's financial needs, the 
parties' standard of living at the time of the trial, and for 
adjustment of the amount of alimony to better equalize the 
parties' abilities to go forward with their respective lives. 
TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
Defendant also urges that the court erred by failing to 
consider the tax consequences of selling the California home. 
Defendant produced an expert witness at trial who testified as 
to the possible tax ramifications of the sale. He discussed 
capital gains tax, but said the amount would depend on the 
sales price, and that it might be avoided pursuant to tax 
regulations. He testified that taxes might be deferred, or 
"rolled over," but could not say with any certainty how the IRS 
would rule. There is no abuse of discretion if a court refuses 
to speculate about hypothetical future tax consequences of a 
property division made pursuant to a divorce. Alexander v. 
Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1987). Tax consequences in 
this case were speculative as to whether they could be avoided 
or delayed, and as to amount. The court heard testimony and 
evidence regarding possible tax implications, but did not err 
in refusing to adjust property distribution because of those 
theoretical consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's property distribution order 
but reverse as to the alimony award and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
3. Exact mathematical equality of income is not required, but 
sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on equal footing 
financially as of the time of the divorce is required. 
890596-CA 7 
I^gnal W. Garff, 
BENCH, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part): 
I agree with the majority opinion's treatment of the "tax 
considerations." I also agree that this case must be remanded 
for entry of appropriate findings as to the needs of defendant 
for alimony and the ability of plaintiff to pay alimony. I 
respectfully disagree with the majority, however, as to how the 
parties' standard of living during the marriage impacts the 
alimony computations. The majority rules, as a matter of law, 
that in computing the alimony award, the trial court should 
have considered a hypothetical standard of living as if the 
parties were living together at the time of trial rather than 
their actual standard of living enjoyed prior to separation.* 
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circumstances during the marriage. The Utah Supreme Court has 
therefore established objective factors that must be considered 
by the trial court when it determines an award of alimony. 
"The most important function of alimony 
is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during marriage, and 
to prevent the wife from becoming a 
public charge." English v. English, 565 
P.2d at 411. With this purpose in mind, 
the Court in English articulated three 
factors that must be considered in 
fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
[1] the financial condition and needs of 
the wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to 
provide support. 
Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). Accord Paffel 
v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100-01 (Utah 1986) (failure to consider 
these factors is an abuse of discretion); Olson v. Olson, 704 
P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985) (an appellate court will not 
disturb a trial court's ruling if these factors are adequately 
addressed). 
As is apparent from the foregoing quotation, the receiving 
spouse*s previous standard of living is not an independent 
factor to be quantified and incorporated into a formula for 
calculating alimony. Rather, it is a frame of reference for 
determining the reasonableness of the alimony award. See 
generally, 2 H. Clark, Jr., The Law Of Domestic Relations In 
The United States § 17.5(8) (2d ed. 1987). In the present 
case, we are not concerned with the risk of defendant becoming 
a public charge given the apparent ability of plaintiff to 
cover defendant's basic needs. The question is how much 
additional support above defendant's basic needs should be 
granted. The parties' standard of living prior to separation 
helps to establish what would be reasonable by showing the 
lifestyle to which the parties have grown accustomed. 
Defendant seeks to benefit from plaintiff's raise by 
mistakenly, and unnecessarily, claiming that the raise entitled 
her to alimony based upon a hypothetical standard of living to 
be calculated from plaintiff's new annual salary of $120,000, 
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an income to which she has never grown accustomed. In other 
words, defendant claims that her relevant standard of living is 
the unknown standard of living that she might have enjoyed were 
the parties not terminating their marriage. Since any attempt 
to determine a standard of living for two separated parties as 
if they were not separated would be purely speculative, the 
majority's ruling is judicially unworkable. There is no 
rational way of knowing how the parties might have utilized the 
increased income had they remained together. Would they have 
bought a new car, a new house, or maybe a vacation timeshare? 
Or would they have simply saved the money for retirement? 
Since a couple's standard of living is determined in large part 
by how they spend their resources, a trial court could do 
nothing but speculate about the possible standard of living if 
the marital relationship had continued beyond separation. 
Not only is such an approach unworkable, it is not needed 
if the traditional approach outlined in English is followed. 
In the present case, the trial court clearly failed to 
determine defendant's financial condition and needs based on 
the expenses she claimed to be necessary to maintain the 
standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. See, e.g., 
Olson, 704 P.2d at 567 ("to maintain the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage, the living expenses of the wife 
and minor children would be $4,200 per month"). 
Defendant presented to the trial court evidence of the 
expenses which she claimed would be necessary to maintain her 
standard of living, but the trial court made no findings 
2. Defendant claims, and the majority seems to agree, that 
defendant is entitled to a larger amount of alimony because she 
"persevered during the lean times." Such an argument does not, 
however, justify an amount in excess of the needs substantiated 
by the receiving spouse. English, 565 P.2d at 412. The 
majority's summary conclusion that the income was "akin to 
deferred income," is totally unsupported. While the parties 
may have perservered at Western Airlines during the lean times, 
there is no evidence that there was any commitment from Western 
that plaintiffs income would increase if and because he stayed 
with the airline. 
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thereon.J The trial court should have reviewed the expenses 
claimed and determined which expenses could be deemed 
reasonable in light of the standard of living she had enioved 
prior to the separation. See, e.g.. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075 
(the couple had enjoyed a "very comfortable lifestyle," alimony 
award of $1,000 per month was insufficient for wife to 
"maintain anything even approaching the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage"). Her reasonable expenses should 
have then been offset by her own resources, i.e., any 
investment income and her own wage-earning capacity. Only then 
could the trial court have made a finding as to defendant's 
needs. 
The trial court should have then gone through the same 
analysis as to the plaintiffs needs and resources in order to 
determine his ability to pay. Again, the reasonableness of his 
claimed expenses should be reviewed with the parties* prior 
standard of living in mind. The trial court should have then 
determined whether plaintiffs resources exceeded his 
reasonable needs. At this point the trial court should have, 
and in fact did, consider the impact of the dramatic increase 
in plaintiffs income. If plaintiff had not received the 
raise, then his ability to pay would be approximately $4,500 
less per month, in which case neither party would likely be 
able to enjoy a standard of living anywhere near their previous 
standard. Inasmuch as plaintiffs raise has increased his 
ability to pay, defendant will be directly benefitted without 
resort to a hypothetical standard of living to which she had 
not grown accustomed. 
After determining what resources were available to the 
parties to meet their own reasonable expenses, the trial court 
should have considered any imbalance in the prospective 
standards of living if the parties were left to support 
themselves with their own resources. If it were apparent that 
defendant could not maintain her previous standard of living 
with her own resources, and that the plaintiff with his 
dramatically increased income could maintain a higher standard 
3. Defendant's actual expenses at the time of trial were 
likely greatly diminished due to her limited income at the 
time. She therefore correctly sought to present not only her 
actual expenses during the separation, but also the expenses 
she claimed would be necessary to maintain or, in many cases 
return to, the standard of living she enjoyed prior to 
separation. 
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of living, then the trial court could have awarded alimony to 
raise the standard of living of the defendant. Davis v. Davis. 
749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988) ("the ultimate test of the 
propriety of an alimony award is whether, given all of these 
factors, the party receiving alimony will be unable to support 
him- or herself 'as nearly as possible at the standard of 
living . . . enjoyed during the marriage,•" quoting English, 
565 P.2d at 411).9 
Inasmuch as the trial court failed to follow the foregoing 
approach, the court abused its discretion in making the alimony 
award. I therefore concur with the majority that this case 
must be remanded to allow the trial court to properly consider 
the established factors and make appropriate findings. 
However, since plaintiffs raise will be fully considered when 
his ability to pay alimony is determined, I believe there is no 
need to depart from the established criteria for determining 
alimony. The parties' standard of living need not, and should 
not, be extrapolated so as to include speculations about what 
their standard of living might have been at the time of trial 
if they had not separated. I therefore respectfully dissent 
from the majority opinion's legal ruling on that point. 
^Russell W. Bench, Judge 
4, The alimony award, however, need not be large enough to 
maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage if that amount of alimony would lower the 
standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the 
receiving spouse. Alimony may only raise the standard of 
living of the receiving spouse until it is roughly equal to 
that of the paying spouse. It is in this sense that alimony 
should seek -to the extent possible, [to] equalize the parties* 
respective post-divorce living standards." Rasband v. Rasband, 
752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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APPENDIX "B' 
JLVJ u j ui<iu rtuv rv.cp u U O U ( d 
Gillmor's January 25 affidavits or, in denying 
the motion to reconsider, disregarded those 
affidavits altogether 
Because the trial court granted summary 
judgment prematurely under the applicable 
procedural rules, and because nothing in the 
record indicates that the court corrected its 
procedural error when that error was called to 
its attention, the summary judgment is set 
aside. See Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. 
v Ironwood Exploration, Inc , 735 P.2d 62, 
62-63 (Utah 1987); K O. v. Demson, 748 
P.2d 588, 591 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We 
reverse and remand to the trial court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each 
party shall pay his or its own costs. 
Pamela T Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR 
Russell W Bench, Judge 
Judith M Billings, Judge 
1 Gillmor correctly claims that there is a disputed 
issue of fact concerning the location of the record 
boundary between his property and that of appel-
lees, as is reflected in his affidavit and those of the 
surveyor This issue, however, is not material with 
respect to the question of whether appellees have 
satisfied the requirements for adverse possession, 
which was the sole ground for their summary judg 
ment motion Indeed, the summary judgment 
motion starts with the assumption that the Garhcks 
and Pelton do in fact occupy property to which 
Gillmor holds record title The true location of the 
record boundary has no bearing on the adverse 
possession claim However, in the event appellees' 
adverse possession defense fails, they must address 
Gillmor's boundary line claim 
2 Utah Code Ann §78 12 12 (1987) requires 
continuous occupation and payment of taxes on 
land adversely claimed 
In no case shall adverse possession be 
considered established under the provi-
sions of any section of this code, unless 
it shall be shown that the land had been 
occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven years continuously, and that the 
party, his predecessors and grantors 
have paid all taxes which have been 
levied and assessed upon such land 
according to law 
Gillmor's memoranda and affidavits apparently 
dispute both the seven vear continuous occupation 
and tax payment for the Garhcks and/or Pelton 
3 Although Gillmor did not include procedural 
error as a basis for appeal in his brief, he did argue 
the issue before the trial court We consider the 
procedural issue on appeal for practical reasons we 
are unable to determine from the record before us 
what the court actually considered in granting the 
summary judgment and denying the motion for 
reconsideration This is similar to those cases where 
we remand for findings because we are unable to 
discern from the record how the court resolved 
material issues See Acton \ Deliran 131 P 2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987), State v Lovegren, 798 P 2d 767, 
770-71 (Utah Ct App 1990) 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant, Barbara Joyce Howell, appeals 
from a divorce decree's award of alimony and 
division of equity in a California home We 
affirm the property division but reverse and 
remand as to alimony 
FACTS 
Defendant and plaintiff, Walter James 
Howell, were married on October 14, 1956 
Plaintiff began working as a pilot for Western 
Airlines shortly after the parties married He 
continued to be employed as a pilot with 
Western, later taken over by Delta Airlines, 
throughout the parties' marriage The parties 
had five children, four of whom were eman-
cipated at the time of trial The parties had 
marital difficulties on and off for a number of 
years and separated in November 1986 At 
that time, plaintiff's gross income was 
between $5500 and S5600 per month, and had 
been at that level for the prior five years 
Western Airlines experienced financial prob 
lems prior to the takeover b> Delta Airlines 
As a result of negotiations between Western 
and its pilots, plaintiff received virtually no 
pay raises between 1981 and 1986, despite 
increases in the cost of living Both parties 
testified that their family finances were stra-
ined during that time period 
Plaintiff filed for divorce in November 
1987 At the time of trial, December 1988, his 
gross monthly income had increased to 
$10,120 Plaintiff's financial declaration ind-
icated monthly expenses of $7960, which inc-
luded $2400 for alimony and child support, 
$372 for vacations, and $633 for attorney fees 
During the parties' marriage, defendant was 
a homemaker and had worked only part time 
at unskilled labor jobs. At the time of trial 
defendant earned $649.80 per month, though 
that job was only temporary and terminated in 
December 1988. She testified at trial that she 
had monthly expenses totaling $5021.1 
The parties owned homes in Utah and Cal-
ifornia, as well as real property in Texas. 
Plaintiff testified that the Utah home had 
little, if any, equity, while the California home 
would yield substantial equity. Plaintiff 
wanted to sell all the properties and divide the 
net proceeds. Defendant testified she would 
prefer to live in the California home. 
After trial, the court entered findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of 
divorce on May 12, 1989. In its findings, the 
court states its belief that "the income level of 
$5500 reflects the income level and living sta-
ndards of the parties during the last five years 
of their lives together." The court found that 
defendant was capable of earning $625 per 
month, and that plaintiff had income of 
$10,000 per month. The findings further state 
that "[t]he court has determined in setting 
alimony that while $5,500.00 per month rep-
resents the living standards of the parties in 
the last 5 years of the marriage, when the 
parties resided together, the ability of the 
plaintiff to pay alimony is based upon his 
present income of $10,000.00 per month." 
Defendant was awarded $1800 per month 
alimony and $1363 per month child support 
for the parties' then sixteen year-old child, 
based on the child support guidelines then in 
effect. The court ordered that all of the real 
property, including the California home, be 
sold and the net proceeds divided equally 
between the parties. 
On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the parties' 
standard of living, for purposes of determi-
ning alimony, should be based on that at the 
time of trial; (2) the alimony awarded is ins-
ufficient; and (3) the trial court should have 
taken into consideration the tax consequences 
of selling the California home. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining alimony and property distribution 
in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal 
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discre-
tion is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband, 
752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject 
to the clearly erroneous standard of review 
such that "due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Conclusions of law, 
however, are reviewed for correctness and 
given no special deference on appeal. Bount-
iful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); 
Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
ALIMOiNY 
Defendant claims that the alimony award 
would have been higher if the trial court had 
considered the parties' standard of living at 
the time of trial rather than when the parties 
separated, approximately two years earlier. 
Additionally, defendant claims alimony should 
have been higher because of the disparity in 
the parties' income, length of the marriage, 
and the parties' respective earning abilities 
and expenses. We consider first the applicable 
standard of living question. 
The value of marital property is determined 
as of the time of the divorce decree or trial. Flet-
cher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 
(Utah 1980). See also Berger v. Berger, 713 
P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). The reason for the 
rule is that "[b]y the very nature of a property 
division, the marital estate is evaluated acco-
rding to what property exists at the time the 
marriage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jespe-
rson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). Courts 
can, however, in the exercise of their equitable 
powers, use a different date, such as the date 
of separation, if one party has "acted obstru-
ctively, ..." Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
No cases in Utah or elsewhere, that we or 
counsel have discovered, have specifically 
addressed the question of when a couple's 
"standard of living" should be determined for 
the purpose of calculating alimony, be it sep-
aration or trial or some other time. Most 
speak only of the standard of living during 
marriage. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). "Standard of living" 
is defined as "a minimum of necessities, 
comforts, or luxuries that is essential to mai-
ntaining a person in customary or proper 
status or circumstances." Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 2223 (1986). 
"An alimony award should, to the extent 
possible, equalize the parties' respective post-
divorce living standards ...." Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 
1980). 
In this case, the parties were separated for 
approximately one year before plaintiff filed 
for divorce. About one year later, trial was 
held. We note that a separation of two years 
before trial in a divorce action is certainly not 
unusual. During that two-year period, plai-
ntiff's income doubled because of the succe-
ssful takeover of Western Airlines by Delta 
Airlines. Plaintiff's ability to take advantage 
of that change was at least in part a result of 
having persevered during the lean times, as did 
his wife and children. The impact of the salary 
increase on the parties' standard of living, 
however, was certainly affected by the fact 
that it was used to maintain separate living 
arrangements. 
We believe it is consistent with the goal of 
equalizing the parties' post divorce status to 
look to the standard of living existing at or 
near the time of trial in determining alimony. 
This is consonant with the treatment of both 
marital property and child support and is 
better designed to equip both parties to go 
forward with their separate lives with relatively 
equal odds. It is further justified because any 
future changes in alimony are limited to inst-
ances where a material change of circumsta-
nces has occurred. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenb-
augh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). In so holding, we agree with the disse-
nting opinion that determining standard of 
living is a "fact-sensitive, subjective task." 
We disagree, however, that standard of living 
is determined by actual expenses alone. Those 
expenses may be necessarily lower than needed 
to maintain an appropriate standard of living 
for various reasons, including, possibly, lack 
of income. As Webster says, standard of living 
includes "customary or proper status" consi-
dering the parties' circumstances. Those circ-
umstances should be evaluated at the time of 
trial and, contrary to the dissent, can properly 
address what situation would have existed if 
the parties had not separated earlier. In this 
case, the post-separation substantial increase 
in plaintiff's income was akin to deferred 
income. In light of the facts of this case, we 
conclude that the trial court erred in looking 
at the pre-separation standard of living in 
setting alimony, but should have instead con-
sidered the standard of living "during the 
marriage" up to the time of trial. In so conc-
luding we do not intend to establish a rigid 
rule which must be followed in all domestic 
cases, but acknowledge that trial courts have 
discretion to determine the standard of living 
which existed during the marriage after cons-
ideration of all relevant facts and equitable 
principles. In this case, it was inequitable and 
an abuse of discretion to pinpoint standard of 
living as of the time of the parties' separation. 
We now turn to defendant's argument that 
the court did not properly consider all relevant 
factors, resulting in an unjustifiably low 
alimony award. Trial courts must consider the 
following factors in setting alimony: (1) the 
financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; (2) the recipient's ability to produce 
income; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse 
to provide support. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 
647, 649 (Utah 1988). Utah cases have stated 
that the purpose of alimony is to prevent the 
receiving spouse "from becoming a public 
charge" and to maintain the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage, to the extent 
possible. Fletcher, 615 P.2d at 1223. There-
fore, trial courts should first, determine the 
financial needs and resources for both parties, 
by examining the three factors enumerated. 
Second, the court should set alimony as per-
mitted by those parameters, to approximate 
the parties' standard of living during the 
marriage as closely as possible. It follows that 
if the payor spouse's resources are adequate, 
alimony need not be limited to provide for 
only basic needs, but should also consider the 
recipient spouse's "station in life." Gramme v. 
Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978). In 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed an 
alimony award after a long-term marriage. 
The court found that the alimony award in 
that situation should, "to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living and maintain them at a level as close as 
possible to that standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage." Id. at 1081. See also Paf-
fel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah 
1986); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 
(Utah 1985). 
The trial court must make findings on all 
material issues. Failure to do so constitutes 
reversible error, unless pertinent facts in the 
record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable 
of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment." Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 
476, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Utah's appellate courts have considered the 
appropriateness of alimony after a long term 
marriage, where the wife (usually) has worked 
primarily in the home, has limited job skills, 
and is in her late forties or fifties. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076; Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333. 
In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), 
the supreme court found alimony awarded 
inadequate to allow the wife a standard of 
living even approaching that experienced 
during the marriage, and described the marr-
iage as follows: 
During most; of the marriage, with 
the full consent and support of her 
husband, [the wife] devoted her 
time to raising their four children 
and donating her services to various 
social service organizations.... It is 
entirely unrealistic to assume that a 
woman in her mid-50's with no 
substantial work experience or tra-
ining will be able to enter the job 
market and support herself in any-
thing even resembling the style in 
which the couple had been living. 
W. at 1075. 
In this case the court made findings as to 
both plaintiff's and defendant's gross 
incomes. It did not, however, make the requ-
ired finding as to defendant's financial needs, 
although defendant testified to monthly exp-
enses of approximately $5,000. Child support 
set pursuant to child support guidelines at 
$1363, plus alimony of $1800, plus defen-
dant's potential salary as determined by the 
court of $645, yields total gross monthly 
income of $3808 for defendant and her son. 
Plaintiff, after deducting child support and 
ilimony, has gross monthly income of $6837. 
When his child support obligation ceases, 
ipproximately fifteen months after the decree, 
ie will have gross monthly income of $8200 in 
comparison to defendant's $2445.2 Defendant 
Its the profile described in Jones and other 
:ases: she is approximately fifty years old, has 
ninimal marketable job skills, and has spent 
nost of the thirty plus years of the parties' 
narriage raising and caring for their five chi-
dren and their home, presumably with the 
concurrence of plaintiff. Her likelihood of 
ichieving significant salary levels in the future 
s slim. The alimony set by the court does not 
:ome close to equalizing the parties' standard 
)f living as of the time of the divorce, but 
dlows plaintiff a two to four times advantage.3 
We, therefore, hold that the alimony amount 
>et by the court was clearly erroneous. 
We reverse and remand to the trial court on 
he issue of alimony, for findings as to defe-
ldant's financial needs, the parties' standard 
)f living at the time of the trial, and for adj-
istment of the amount of alimony to better 
equalize the parties' abilities to go forward 
vith their respective lives. 
TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
Defendant also urges that the court erred by 
ailing to consider the tax consequences of 
elling the California home. Defendant prod-
iced an expert witness at trial who testified as 
o the possible tax ramifications of the sale, 
l e discussed capital gains tax, but said the 
imount would depend on the sales price, and 
hat it might be avoided pursuant to tax reg-
llations. He testified that taxes might be def-
erred, or "rolled over," but could not say with 
iny certainty how the IRS would rule. There is 
10 abuse of discretion if a court refuses to 
.peculate about hypothetical future tax cons-
equences of a property division made pursuant 
o a divorce. Alexander v. Alexander, 131 
5
.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1987). Tax consequences 
n this case were speculative as to whether they 
:ould be avoided or delayed, and as to 
imount. The court heard testimony and evi-
lence regarding possible tax implications, but 
lid not err in refusing to adjust property dis-
ribution because of those theoretical conseq-
lences. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's property disto-
r t i o n order but reverse as to the alimony 
tward and remand for further proceedings 
insistent with this opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
i. Defendant filed an earlier declaration of monthly 
'xpenses totaling $4464.62, but included no expenses 
or real property taxes or insurance, indicating that 
hey were then unknown. 
2. "If courts award child support in lieu of perma-
nent alimony, they may fail to anticipate the finan-
cial impact on the remaining family as each child 
reaches age 18 and his or her award terminates." 
March 1990 Utah Task Force on Gender and Justice 
Report to the Utah Judicial Council 38. 
3. Exact mathematical equality of income is not 
required, but sufficient parity to allow both parties 
to be on equal footing financially as of the time of 
the divorce is required. 
BENCH, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting 
in part): 
I agree with the majority opinion's treat-
ment of the "tax considerations." I also agree 
that this case must be remanded for entry of 
appropriate findings as to the needs of defe-
ndant for alimony and the ability of plaintiff 
to pay alimony. I respectfully disagree with 
the majority, however, as to how the parties' 
standard of living during the marriage impacts 
the alimony computations. The majority rules, 
as a matter of law, that in computing the 
alimony award, the trial court should have 
considered a hypothetical standard of living as 
if the parties were living together at the time 
of trial rather than their actual standard of 
living enjoyed prior to separation.1 
There are no cases addressing when the 
parties' standard of living is determined 
because a "standard of living" cannot, as the 
majority implies, be quantified by the trial 
court. It is not like marital property which is 
capable of objective valuation at a given time. 
Nor is it capable of being calculated based on 
set figures of income as are child support 
payments. Determining the parties' standard 
of living during marriage is a fact-sensitive, 
subjective task that requires a trial court to 
look at the totality of the parties' financial 
circumstances during the marriage. The Utah 
Supreme Court has therefore established obj-
ective factors that must be considered by the 
trial court when it determines an award of 
alimony. 
"The most important function of 
alimony is to provide support for 
the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed 
during marriage, and to prevent the 
wife from becoming a public 
charge." English v. English, 565 
P.2d at 411. With this purpose in 
mind, the Court in English articul-
ated three factors that must be 
considered in fixing a reasonable 
alimony award: 
[1] the financial condition and 
needs of the wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to 
produce a sufficient income for 
herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to 
provide support. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 
1985). Accord Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 
100-01 (Utah 1986) (failure to consider these 
factors is an abuse of discretion); Olson v. 
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985) (an 
appellate court will not disturb a trial court's 
ruling if these factors are adequately addre-
ssed). 
As is apparent from the foregoing quota-
tion, the receiving spouse's previous standard 
of living is not an independent factor to be 
quantified and incorporated into a formula for 
calculating alimony. Rather, it is a frame of 
reference for determining the reasonableness 
of the alimony award. See generally, 2 H. 
Clark, Jr., The Law Of Domestic Relations In 
The United States §17.5(8) (2d ed. 1987). In 
the present case, we are not concerned with 
the risk of defendant becoming a public 
charge given the apparent ability of plaintiff 
to cover defendant's basic needs. The question 
is how much additional support above defen-
dant's basic needs should be granted. The 
parties' standard of living prior to separation 
helps to establish what would be reasonable by 
showing the lifestyle to which the parties have 
grown accustomed. 
Defendant seeks to benefit from plaintiff's 
raise by mistakenly, and unnecessarily, clai-
ming that the raise entitled her to alimony 
based upon a hypothetical standard of living 
to be calculated from plaintiff's new annual 
salary of $120,000, an income to which she 
has never grown accustomed.2 In other words, 
defendant claims that her relevant standard of 
living is the unknown standard of living that 
she might have enjoyed were the parties not 
terminating their marriage. Since any attempt 
to determine a standard of living for two 
separated parties as if they were not separated 
would be purely speculative, the majority's 
ruling is judicially unworkable. There is no 
rational way of knowing how the parties might 
have utilized the increased income had they 
remained together. Would they have bought a 
new car, a new house, or maybe a vacation 
timeshare? Or would they have simply saved 
the money for retirement? Since a couple's 
standard of living is determined in large part 
by how they spend their resources, a trial 
court could do nothing but speculate about the 
possible standard of living if the marital rela-
tionship had continued beyond separation. 
Not only is such an approach unworkable, it 
is not needed if the traditional approach out-
lined in English is followed. In the present 
case, the trial court clearly failed to determine 
defendant's financial condition and needs 
based on the expenses she claimed to be nec-
essary to maintain the standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage. See, e.g., Olson, 
704 P.2d at 567 ("to maintain the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage, the living 
expenses of the wife and minor children would 
be $4,200 per month"). 
Defendant presented to the trial court evi-
dence of the expenses which she claimed 
would be necessary to maintain her standard 
of living, but the trial court made no findings 
thereon.3 The trial court should have reviewed 
the expenses claimed and determined which 
expenses could be deemed reasonable in light 
of the standard of living she had enjoyed prior 
to the separation. See, e.g., Jones, 700 P.2d at 
1075 (the couple had enjoyed a "very comfo-
rtable lifestyle/' alimony award of $1,000 per 
month was insufficient for wife to "maintain 
anything even approaching the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage"). Her 
reasonable expenses should have then been 
offset by her own resources, i.e., any invest-
ment income and her own wage-earning 
capacity. Only then could the trial court have 
made a finding as to defendant's needs. 
The trial court should have then gone 
through the same analysis as to the plaintiff's 
needs and resources in order to determine his 
ability to pay. Again, the reasonableness of his 
claimed expenses should be reviewed with the 
parties' prior standard of living in mind. The 
trial court should have then determined 
whether plaintiffs resources exceeded his 
reasonable needs. At this point the trial court 
should have, and in fact did, consider the 
impact of the dramatic increase in plaintiffs 
income. If plaintiff had not received the raise, 
then his ability to pay would be approximately 
$4,500 less per month, in which case neither 
party would likely be able to enjoy a standard 
of living anywhere near their previous stan-
dard. Inasmuch as plaintiff's raise has incre-
ased his ability to, pay, defendant will be dir-
ectly benefitted without resort to a hypothet-
ical standard of living to which she had not 
grown accustomed. 
After determining what resources were 
available to the parties to meet their own 
reasonable expenses, the trial court should 
have considered any imbalance in the prospe-
ctive standards of living if the parties were left 
to support themselves with their own resou-
rces. If it were apparent that defendant could 
not maintain her previous standard of living 
with her own resources, and that the plaintiff 
with his dramatically increased income could 
maintain a higher standard of living, then the 
trial court could have awarded alimony to 
raise the standard of living of the defendant. 
Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988) 
("the ultimate test of the propriety of an 
alimony award is whether, given all of these 
factors, the party receiving alimony will be 
unable to support him- or herself 'as nearly 
as possible at the standard of living ... enjoyed 
during the marriage,'" quoting English, 565 
P.2dat411).4 
Inasmuch as the trial court failed to follow 
the foregoing approach, the court abused its 
discretion in making the alimnnv award T 
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therefore concur with the majority that this 
case must be remanded to allow the trial court 
to properly consider the established factors 
and make appropriate findings. However, 
since plaintiffs raise will be fully considered 
when his ability to pay alimony is determined, 
I believe there is no need to depart from the 
established criteria for determining alimony. 
The parties' standard of living need not, and 
should not, be extrapolated so as to include 
speculations about what their standard of 
living might have been at the time of trial if 
they had not separated. I therefore respectfully 
dissent from the majority opinion's legal 
ruling on that point. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the trial 
court did not "pinpoint" the parties' standard of 
living as of the time of separation. The trial court 
took the parties' average income over a five-year 
period prior to separation and assumed that their 
average income was their "standard of living." 
While it is clear that the trial court erred in assu-
ming that income alone establishes a standard of 
living, it may not be said that it made the mistake 
of pinpointing that standard of living. The majority 
therefore errs in finding that the trial court abused 
its discretion when the trial court did not even make 
the mistake that the majority is accusing it of 
making. 
2. Defendant claims, and the majority seems to 
agree, that defendant is entitled to a larger amount 
of alimony because she "persevered during the lean 
times." Such an argument does not, however, justify 
an amount in excess of the needs substantiated by 
the receiving spouse. English, 565 P.2d at 412. The 
majority's summary conclusion that the income was 
"akin to deferred income," is totally unsupported. 
While the parties may have perservered at Western 
Airlines during the lean times, there is no evidence 
that there was any commitment from Western that 
plaintiffs income would increase if and because he 
stayed with the airline. 
3. Defendant's actual expenses at the time of trial 
were likely greatly diminished due to her limited 
income at the time. She therefore correctly sought to 
present not only her actual expenses during the 
separation, but also the expenses she claimed would 
be necessary to maintain or, in many cases return 
to, the standard of living she enjoyed prior to sep-
aration. 
4. The alimony award, however, need not be large 
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the sta-
ndard of living enjoyed during the marriage if that 
amount of alimony would lower the standard of 
living of the paying spouse below that of the recei-
ving spouse. Alimony may only raise the standard 
of living of the receiving spouse until it is roughly 
equal to that of the paying spouse. It is in this sense 
that alimony should seek "to the extent possible, 
[to] equalize the parties' respective post-divorce 
living standards." Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Michael Salata appeals from an order of the 
juvenile court terminating his parental rights 
to M.S., his young child.1 We affirm. 
Salata suffers from schizophrenia, which 
has afflicted him for at least sixteen years. His 
condition includes "anti-social traits/ ' and he 
has been repeatedly incarcerated. When not 
incarcerated or hospitalized, he has occasion-
ally been homeless. Although Salata has sub-
mitted to voluntary hospitalization at least 
four times, he generally resists attempts to 
treat his illness and sees them as unwarranted 
interferences with his life. 
In 1987, Salata lived with a woman and 
fathered M.S. After birth, M.S. lived with 
Salata for several months, but was removed 
from Salata's custody after workers from the 
Division of Family Services observed unsani-
tary conditions and a lack of parental care. 
Three treatment plans were developed with the 
objective of reuniting M.S. and Salata, but 
Salata did not fulfill his commitments under 
the plans. 
The juvenile court found that Salata's 
mental illness manifests itself in 
(1) A pattern of blaming others 
for his misfortunes and an almost 
complete inability to recognize any 
deficiencies in his lifestyle choices 
or parenting abilities. 
(2) A persistent denial of any 
justification for state intervention 
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The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e c o u r t f o r 
t r i a l on T h u r s d a y , t h e 22nd day of December, 1988, t h e 
Honorable F rank G. Noel p r e s i d i n g . The p l a i n t i f f was p r e s e n t 
i n p e r s o n and r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , David S. Dolowitz and 
J o h n Mason. The d e f e n d a n t was p r e s e n t i n p e r s o n and 
r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , Paul H. L i a p i s . The c o u r t h e a r d and 
c o n s i d e r e d t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e p a r t i e s , r e c e i v e d e x h i b i t s 
i n t o e v i d e n c e and d e t e r m i n e d t o t a k e t h e m a t t e r u n d e r 
advisement . T h e r e a f t e r , b e i n g a d v i s e d i n t h e p r e m i s e s , t he 
court announced its decision in open court on the 19th day of 
January, 1989. The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree to the court, 
provisions to which defendant objected. Those objections were 
heard and resolved before the court on April 27, 1989. 
Accordingly, the court now makes and enters the following as 
its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant was a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, when this action was filed and had been so for 
more than three months immediately prior thereto. 
2, The parties are husband and wife, having been 
married on October 14, 1956, in Cushing, Oklahoma. 
3. Irreconcilable differences arose between the 
parties which they attempted to reconcile, but were unable to 
do so. 
4, There were five (5) children born as issue of this 
marriage; four (4) are emancipated. Both of the parties 
agreed that care, custody and control of the one (1) remaining 
minor child of the parties, Sean Daniel Howell, born August 
21, 1972, age 16, should be awarded to the defendant, subject 
to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff. The 
defendant is a fir and proper parent to be awarded the care, 
custody and control of the minor child of the parties. 
5. At the time of the separation of the parties, the 
plaintiff was earning between $5,500.00 per month and 
$5, 600. 00 per month and had been earning this sum for five 
years prior to -chis time. After separation, the plaintiff 
filed an action for divorce which he dismissed at trial; that 
after a two-day attempted reconciliation, he filed this 
action. 
6. The court believes the income level of $5,500. 00 
reflects the income level and living standards of the parties 
during the last five years of theii: lives together. 
7. The plaintiff earns, from his present employment, 
a salary of $10,000.00 per month. The court has determined in 
setting alimony that while $5,500. 00 per month represents the 
living standards of the parties in the last 5 years of the 
marriage, when the parties resided together, the ability of 
the plaintiff to pay alimony is based upon his present income 
of $10,000.00 per month. 
8. The defendant earns, or is capable of earning, 
$7, 500. 00 per year, or $625. 00 per month. At the time of 
trial, defendant was employed with Casual Furniture on a part-
tine basis earning a gross income of $649. 80 per month, 
although that employment was scheduled to end on December 31, 
1988 and she had not yet secured replacement employment. 
9. Application of the Child Support Guidelines 
3 
adopted by the courts of the State of Utah would require the 
payment of child support from the plaintiff to the defendant 
in the sum of $1, 363. 00 per month based upon plaintiff s 
income of $10,000.00 per month until Sean attains the age of 
18 and graduates from high school with his regularly-scheduled 
graduating class. 
10. The plaintiff filed separate tax returns in 1986 
and 1987 and the defendant has not filed tax returns for those 
years. 
11. The parties acquired, during the course of their 
marriage, a home and real property located in California, to-
wit: 1767 Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, which was zhe 
primary residence of the parties prior to their move to Utah 
in 1984; a home and real property located in Utah, to-wit: 
8241 Top of the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah; seven (7) 
lots in the state of Texas; interests in a series of pension 
plans maintained by the employer of the plaintiff, to-wit: 
Western Airlines and Delta Airlines, (these plans are the 
Western Airlines Plan A, the Western Airlines Plan B, the 
Western Airlines Plan D, the Delta Plan and the Delta Savings 
Plan); and an interest in a military retirement plan, part of 
which was earned prior to the marriage; three IRA accounts, 
one in the name of the plaintiff for $7,546. 57, a second in 
the name of the plaintiff in the sum of $4,196.43 and one in 
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the name of the defendant for $10, 397. 00; bank accounts at 
Western Federal Credit Union, Ranier Bank, Valley Bank, Mt. 
West Savings, and Camarillo Community Bank; 8. 6023 shares of 
Delta stock; stock in Continental Power Co. ; furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and appliances; five guns; an IBM 
computer and software; a 1977 Buick automobile; a 1987 Ford 
truck and camper; a 1980 Datsun 280Z; a 1978 ski boat; a 1982 
fold boat and motor; several pieces of ivory; and a 35mm 
camera, 
12. The plaintiff testified that the precise term of 
the military retirement plan is being re-examined by the 
United States Navy, as plaintiff was ^  in the Naval Reserve 
prior to going on active duty and this period of time should 
have been included in the plan calculations but had not, as 
of the date of trial, and this determination had been appealed 
and was being reviewed by the Navy. 
13. After separation of the parties, the plaintiff 
withdrew $33,000.00 from a retirement fund which was expended 
to pay for marital debts of the parties, to-wit: $16,000.00 
to repay a loan $3,400.00 on the VISA account; $12,500.00 to 
pay income taxes; $1,000.00 on their daughter's wedding; and 
$600.00 to refinance the parties' home. 
14. The parties acquired various debts which remain 
unpaid, to-wit: 
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Tracy Collins Bank 
Camarillo Community Bank 
Defendant's Personal Loan (attorney's fees) 




Western Federal Credit Union 
Western Federal Credit Union for camper 
Security Pacific Solar Loan 
Valley Bank VISA 
State of California taxes. 
15. The plaintiff has two life insurance policies, one 
with Delta Airlines for $100,000.00 and one with Beneficial 
Life Insurance for $100,000.00. 
16. The defendant employed counsel to represent her in 
this matter and does not have a ready source of assets from 
which she can pay for the services whicff she has secured. 
17. The plaintiff has available, through his 
employment, health and dental insurance and will maintain 
health and dental insurance for Walter and Sean as long as it 
is available through his employment. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now 
makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter of this action. 
2. Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce, terminating the marriage between them on the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences. 
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3. Care, custody and control of the minor child of 
the parties, Sean Howell, should be awarded to the defendant, 
subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff. 
4. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay child 
support to the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1,363.00 
per month until Sean is 18 and graduated from high school with 
his regularly-scheduled class. Payments should be made on the 
20th of each month. 
5. The income exemption for Sean should be awarded to 
the defendant. 
6. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay alimony to 
the defendant based upon the standard of living enjoyed by the 
parties at the time of their separation in 1986. Accordingly, 
he should pay her $1,800. 00 per month, one-half on the 5th of 
each month; one-half on the 20th of each month until such 
time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom she 
is not married, or further order of the court. 
7. The parties should divide the retirement plan 
benefits acquired by them during the course of their marriage 
at the value determined by this court on December 22, 1988, by 
appropriate qualified domestic relations order, that is, the 
Western Airlines Plan A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta 
Savings Plan and Delta Plan, which should be effected by 
separate orders to implement the provision of the Decree of 
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Divorce. 
8. The military retirement plan of the parties, once 
finally valued and the period of service set, should be 
divided by application of the Woodward formula. The plaintiff 
should keep the defendant advised as to the progress of this 
inquiry and the actions and decisions of the United States 
Navy. 
9. Plaintiff should be awarded the IRA in his name at 
Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7, 546. 57 and the IRA at the 
Western Federal Credit Union of $4, 196.43, and the defendant 
should be awarded her IRA in the amount of $10, 397. 00. 
10. The plaintiff should be ordered to maintain the 
health and dental insurance that is available to him through 
his employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, so 
long as that insurance is available to him through the age of 
21. Each of the parties should pay one-half of any 
extraordinary medical, dental, orthodontic or eyecare expense 
which is not covered by insurance. 
11. The plaintiff has available to him life insurance 
in the sum of $100,000.00. He should be required to maintain 
Matthew and Sean as beneficiaries of that policy until they 
attain the age of 21 years or are married. After that occurs, 
he shall be free to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of 
that insurance. To assist the children in assuring this 
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coverage, the plaintiff should provide them with the policy 
number and name of the insurance company. 
12. The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with 
the defendant in making available to her all health insurance 
benefits for which she can qualify under the COBRA provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code. 
13. The home and real property in California, at 1767 
Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, should be sold for the 
best possible price and at the earliest possible time. The 
net proceeds of sale divided equally between the parties. 
There is presently a debt due to the State of California for 
taxes. If it is determined that those are property taxes, 
they should be paid from the proceeds of sale of this property 
prior to division of the proceeds of sale. If it is 
determined that those are taxes for any other reason, the 
plaintiff should assume and pay those taxes and hold the 
defendant harmless therefrom. The plaintiff should be 
responsible for the sale of the California home, and should 
keep the defendant fully advised as to that transaction, and 
the defendant should take all actions necessary to effect 
sale. 
14. The home and real property in Utah should be 
placed for sale at the best possible price and sold at the 
earliest possible date. The plaintiff should pay the 
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mortgage for the months of February, March and April, 1939, 
and if the January house payment has not been made, he should 
make that payment. Thereafter, the defendant shall be 
responsible for those payments if the home is not sold. The 
defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep 
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties 
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale. 
15. The 3. 6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental 
Po^er Stock should be awarded to the plaintiff. 
16. The parties should sell one of the seven lots in 
Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each 
should be awarded three of the remaining lots. 
17. Each of the parries have accumulated savings 
accounts in their own names and they should be awarded those 
savings, to-wit: the plaintiff should be awarded the Western 
Federal Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the 
Valley Bank account, while the defendant should be awarded the 
Mountain West Savings account and the Camarillo Community Bank 
account. 
18. The insurance proceeds for the 1977 Buick should 
be awarded to the defendant who should also be awarded the 
1980 Datsun 280Z. 
19. The 1987 Ford truck and camper should be awarded 
X-O ^ a c J J i G l i i L l l l . 
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20. The 1969 Ford automobile should be awarded to 
Matthew. 
21. The 1978 ski boat should be awarded to the 
defendant. 
22. The 1982 fold boat and engine should be awarded to 
the plaintiff. 
23. Each of the parties should be awarded the 
furnishings, fixtures, furniture and appliances in their own 
possession with the exception of the IBM computer and computer 
software in the plaintiff s possession which should be awarded 
to the defendant and the 3 5mm camera which should be awarded 
to the plaintiff. 
24. Each of the parties should be awarded one-half of 
the ivory collection. 
25. Each of the parties should be ordered to make 
available family photographs in their possession to the other 
for copying. The photographs should be divided fairly between 
them. 
26. The plaintiff has accounted for the $33, 000. 00 he 
removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court 
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the 
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of 
the marital estate as set forth above. 
27. Each of the parties should be ordered to assume 
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and pay the debts in their own name with the exception of the 
mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that 
the plaintiff should pay the mortgage on the California home 
and may use the rent received from the California home until 
its sale. The plaintiff should pay the mortgage payments on 
the Utah home for February, March, and April, 1989, and the 
January payment, if that has not been paid. Thereafter, the 
defendant should be responsible for payment of that debt. 
The plaintiff should pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home); 
b. Western Federal Credit Union (pick-up); 
c. Western Federal Credit Union (camper); 
d. Security Facific solar loan; 
f. State of California taxes. 
The defendant should pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home); 
b. Tracy Collins Bank; 
C. Camarillo Community Bank; 
d. Personal loan (attorney fees); 




28. The parties should consult with an accountant 
regarding the filing of amended joint 1986 and 1987 tax 
returns. If these can be filed and the parties save money and 
secure a refund in excess of the $2, 500. 00 that has been 
received by the plaintiff, they should do so and divide all 
refunds received in excess of the $2,500.00 which has already 
12 
been received by the plaintiff. 
29. The plaintiff should be ordered to pay on behalf 
of the defendant the sum of $7,500.00 to assist her in the 
payment of her attorney fees within thirty (30) days from 
entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
FRANK G. NOEL 
District Court Judge 
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The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 22nd day of December, 1988, the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. The plaintiff was present 
in person and represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz and 
John Mason. The defendant was present in person and 
represented by counsel, Paul H. Liapis. The court heard and 
considered the testimony of the parties, received exhibits 
into evidence and determined to take the matter under 
advisement. Thereafter, being advised in the premises, the 
court announced its decision in open court on.the 19th dayiof 
January, 1989. The plaintiff then submitted proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree to the court; 
provisions of which the defendant then objected. Those 
objections were heard and resolved before the court on April 
27, 1989. Accordingly, the court, having made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter of this action. 
2. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of 
Divorce, terminating their marriage. 
3. Care, custody and control of the minor child of 
the parties, Sean Howell, is awarded to the defendant, 
subject to reasonable rights of visitation in the plaintiff. 
4. The plaintiff is ordered to pay child support to 
the defendant for Sean in the amount of $1, 363. 00 per month 
on the 20th of each month until Sean is 18 and graduates from 
high school with his regularly-scheduled class. 
5. The income exemption for Sean is awarded to the 
defendant. 
6. The plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to the 
defendant in the sum of $1,800.00 per month, one-half on the 






J such time as she dies, remarries, cohabits with a man to whom 
|l 
j| she is not married, or further order of the court, 
I 7. The parties shall divide the retirement plan 
• i 
II benefits, valued as of December 22, 1988, acquired by them 
I during the course of their marriage by appropriate qualified 
domestic relations order, that is, the Western Airlines Plan 
A, Plan B, and Plan D, and the Delta Savings Plan and Delta 
ji Flan, which shall be effected by separate orders to implement 
I the provision of the Decree of Divorce. 
8. The military retirement plan of the parties, once 
j finally valued and the period of service set, shall be 
ij divided by application of the Woodward formula. The plaintiff 
j shall keep the defendant advised as to **the progress of this 
I! inquiry and the actions and decisions of the United States 
Navy, 
9. Plaintiff is awarded the IRA in his name at 
Merrill Lynch in the amount of $7, 546. 57 and the IRA at the 
|| Western Federal Credit Union in the amount of $4, 196. 43, and 
the defendant is awarded her IRA in rhe amount of $10, 397. 00. 
10. The plaintiff is ordered to maintain the health 
j| and dental insurance that is available to him through his 
I employment on both Sean and his older brother, Walter, through 
[j the age of 21, so long as that insurance is available to him. 
Each of the parties shall pay one-half of any extra-
I 3 
j ordinary medical, dental, orthodontic or eyecare expense 
I which is not covered by insurance. 
| 11, The plaintiff has available to him life insurance 
J in the sum of $100,000.00, He shall maintain Matthew and Sean 
as beneficiaries of that policy until they attain the age of 
21 years or are married* After that occurs, he shall be free 
to name whomever he wishes as beneficiary of that insurance. 
To assist the children in assuring this coverage, the 
plaintiff shall provide them with the policy number and name 
of the insurance company. 
12. The plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with 
the defendant in making available to her all health insurance 
benefits for which she can qualify underMihe COBRA provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code. 
13. The home and real property in California, at 1767 
Calle Rocas, Camarillo, California, legally described as: 
LOT 44, TRACT NO. 1359, in the County of 
Ventura, State of California, as per Map 
recorded in Book 35, Page 59 of Maps, in 
the office of the County Recorder of said 
county, 
jj shall be sold for the best possible price and at the earliest 
ii 
jj possible time. The net proceeds of sale shall be divided 
Ii 
Jj equally between the parties. There is presently a debt due to 
il the State of California for taxes. If it is determined that 
I those are property taxes, they shall be paid from the 
4 
proceeds of sale of this property prior to division of the 
proceeds of sale. If it is determined that those are taxes 
for any other reason, the plaintiff shall assume and pay 
those taxes and hold the defendant harmless therefrom. The 
plaintiff shall be responsible for the sale of the California 
home, and should keep the defendant fully advised as to that 
transaction, and the defendant should take ail actions 
necessary to effect the sale. 
14. The home and real property in Utah, at 8241 Top of 
the World Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the adjacent lot, 
legally described as: 
(House) LOT 18, TO? OF THE WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION; 
(Lot) BEG S 84 FT FR NE COR^LOT 17, TOP OF THE 
WORLD #3 SUBDIVISION; S 84 FT; E 100 FT; 
W 100 FT TO BEG. 0. 2 AC M OR L; 
shall be placed for sale at the best possible price and sold 
at the earliest possible date. The plaintiff shall pay the 
mortgage for the months of February, March and April, 1989, 
and if the January house payment has not been made, he shall 
make that payment. Thereafter, the defendant shall be 
responsible for those payments if the home is not sold. The 
defendant shall be responsible for this sale and shall keep 
the plaintiff advised as to that transaction and the parties 
shall divide equally the net proceeds of sale. 
15. The 8. 6023 shares of Delta stock and Continental 
5 
Power Stock are awarded to the plaintiff, 
16. The parties shall sell one of the seven lots in 
Texas and divide the net proceeds of sale between them. Each 
| is awarded three of the remaining lots. 
17. Each of the parties has accumulated savings 
accounts in their own names and they are awarded those 
savings, to-wit: the plaintiff is awarded the Western Federal 
Credit Union account; the Ranier Bank account; and the Valley 
Bank account, while the defendant is awarded the Mountain 




18. The insurance proceeds for the 1977 Buick are 
awarded to the defendant who is also awarded the 1980 Datsun 
280Z. 
19. The 1987 Ford truck and camper are awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
20. The 1969 Ford automobile is awarded to Matthew. 
21. The 1978 ski boat is awarded to the defendant. 
22. The 1982 fold boat and engine are awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
23. Each of the parties is awarded the furnishings, 
fixtures, furniture and appliances in their own possession 
with the exception of the IBM computer and computer software 
in the plaintiff s possession which are awarded to the 
defendant and the 35mm camera which is awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
24. Each of the parties is awarded one-half of the 
ivory collection. 
25. Each of the parties is ordered to make available 
family photographs in their possession to the other for 
copying. The photographs are to be divided fairly between 
them. 
26. The plaintiff has accounted for the $33,000.00 he 
removed from the retirement to the satisfaction of the court 
and no order is entered in regard to those funds which the 
court believes are appropriately resolved in the division of 
the marital estate as set forth above. 
27. Each of the parties is ordered to assume and pay 
the debts in their own name with the exception of the 
mortgage provisions set forth above, which, restated, are that 
the plaintiff shall pay the mortgage on the California home 
and may use the rent received from the California home until 
its sale. The plaintiff shall pay the mortgage payments on 
the Utah home for February, March, and April, 1989, and the 
January payment, if that has not been paid. Thereafter, the 
defendant shall be responsible for payment of that debt. The 
'plaintiff shall pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Weyerhauser Mortgage (Calif, home); 




c. Western Federal Credit Union (camper); 
d. Security Pacific solar loan; 
e. Valley Bank VISA; 
f. State of California taxes. 
and the defendant shall pay the debts due and owing to: 
a. Lincoln Mortgage (Utah home); 
b. Tracy Collins Bank; 
c. Camarillo Community Bank; 
d. Personal loan (attorney fees); 




28. The parties are ordered to consult with an 
accountant regarding the filing of amended joint 1986 and 1987 
tax returns. If these can be filed and the parties save money 
and secure a refund in excess of the $2, 500. 00 that has been 
received by the plaintiff, they shall do so and divide all 
refunds received in excess of the $2,500. 00 which has already 
been received by the plaintiff. 
29. The plaintiff is ordered to pay on behalf of the 
defendant the sum of $7,500.00 to assist her in the payment of 
her attorney fees within thirty (30) days from entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this / oLday of , 1989. 
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PAUL H. "LIAPIS/ 
Attorney for Defendant 
